Bosnia update: Sanctions, creeping secession, Ukraine war, electoral machinations
In the spring of 2022 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its permanently corrupt leadership, its beleaguered citizens, and its contending international officials of all sorts, bumps along toward an uncertain future. The secessionists keep on with their divisive work. Ordinary people are re-traumatized by the Ukraine war. The exodus continues. Meanwhile, authoritarian leaders in the vicinity of Bosnia, eager to keep Bosnia destabilized, have new wind in their sails, but some Western leaders attempt to restrain these trends.
The strongest move towards fascism in Europe today is, of course, the Russian attempt to obliterate Ukraine. Given this, the Ukrainian resistance is on the front line in pushing back against Russia, and this resistance is therefore critical to the survival of whatever passes for democracy and freedom in the rest of Europe.
This is pertinent to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s near future. It’s not that Russia, after destroying Ukraine, will come after BiH directly. But an eventual Russian victory in Ukraine, be it whole or in part, would bolster Russia’s continued, years-long meddling and destabilization of Bosnia, especially via Serbia. Russia and China continue to provide Serbia with sophisticated, aggressive military equipment, and Serbia continues to support President Milorad Dodik’s drive for secession.
In the first weekend of April national elections were held in Serbia and in neighboring Hungary. Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić won strongly, as did Hungarian president Orban. Both flirt with the EU (Hungary is a member) and collaborate with Russia, playing both sides of the imperial divide. As with much else in the region, which way the two regimes pursue their fortunes will be strongly affected by what happens in Ukraine.
There have been a variety of efforts on the part of Western governments to push back against Dodik’s and Croat leader Dragan Čović’s destabilizing efforts. To recap these efforts, which I’ve covered in previous blog entries: the RS has proposed, and in some cases passed, laws transferring state powers to the entity. These include creation of a medical/pharmaceutical agency; an entity-based indirect tax authority; an entity-based High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council; entity possession of agricultural, forest, and other state property; and the eventual withdrawal from the Bosnian armed forces and establishment of an RS army. Creation of the entity-based army has not been initiated.
State Property
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia last year declared that the RS may not legally take possession of agricultural and forest lands. Now, an RS law has gone into force that transfers ownership of state-owned property to the entity. This includes land and real estate—especially military property—that devolved to Bosnia’s control under a 2001 resolution of succession pertaining to Yugoslav possessions, and those of the former Republic of Bosnia as well. The Constitutional Court later affirmed the sole right of the state to control these possessions.
In response to the recent RS law transferring state properties, in early April High Representative Christian Schmidt used his Bonn powers for the first time since his mandate began last August, and suspended the law. He called for the Constitutional Court to evaluate the law, and one public official filed a formal request for this to take place.
On the RS side, there has been great protest. In keeping with the official attitude that Schmidt is not legitimately a High Representative (because he was appointed by the Peace Implementation Council, but not approved by the UN Security Council), the RS asserts that the new property law is still in force. But there is no indication that it will be implemented soon.
As I’ve mentioned before, secessionist moves creep along, but without really flagrant expression because there is a degree of hesitation in response to the Ukraine war. This is particularly true on the part of Vučić, who is a savvy enough leader to know when to stay on the fence. In that light, he has given Schmidt a certain amount of legitimacy recently by meeting with him and calling him the High Representative. This to some extent reduces Dodik’s momentum. And in a recent meeting with Dodik, Vučić admonished him not to follow through with his initiative to form an RS army, at least not in the near future.
Vučić’s opinions carry weight with Dodik, and so Dodik commented that the entity army was on hold, a project for later on. But in response to Schmidt’s action, Dodik said, “It’s time for the tourist Schmidt to buy a one-way ticket back to Germany. His vacation is over.”
The RS organized a rally for “freedom” in Banja Luka on April 20, ostensibly a protest against Schmidt’s move by RS veterans of the 1990s war. It was clear that the initiative—and logistical resources—for this rally came from Dodik’s SNSD party, and many veterans were at a loss to understand how the rally concerned them and their existential needs. At the moderatly attended rally, a controversy was generated when a band, in the presence of Dodik, sang a ditty that threatened to slaughter HR Schmidt.
A further chilling interaction took place when a professor from the East Sarajevo (RS) Law Faculty attempted to show that genocide had nothing to do with the creation of the RS. But when he called out, rhetorically, “Are we a genocidal people?”, the audience enthusiastically responded, “Yes!”, and when he asked, “Is the RS a genocidal creation (genocidna tvorevina)?” the audience again responded similarly (1).
All this behavior fits with the style of President Dodik, who created another stir not long ago when he insulted all independent journalists of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was in a limousine, arriving for a court deposition, and he gave journalists the finger, through the car window. The Bosnian association of journalists protested, and Dodik backtracked, saying, “This was not directed at all journalists, only those from BN TV, who fabricate lies about me.”
Russia also intervened in response to Schmidt’s cancellation of the RS property law. The Russian Embassy in Sarajevo repeated its opinion that HR Schmidt “could not be considered the High Representative” and, as such, he had no powers in the rubric of the Dayton agreement; thus, all of his decisions were illegitimate. Russian officials asked the Peace Implementation Council (PIC—enforcer of Dayton) to annul Schmidt’s decision. A week later, Russia announced that it was suspending its monetary contributions to the funding of the Office of the High Representative.
Corrupt Leaders and the Prosecutors who Protect Them
The occasion for Dodik’s deposition is relevant background here. Dodik was called for questioning about his 2007 purchase of a mansion in Belgrade’s elite Dedinje neighborhood. What is fishy about this purchase is that he paid 750,000 euros for the villa in 2007, but was given credit for the purchase from Pavlović Banka only the next year. So the question is why that money was transferred a year later than the purchase, and with what money did he actually pay for the house?
Another question is why this case is coming up for review 15 years after the fact, but we know the answer to that one. That is, Dodik’s man Milan Tegeltija was president of the state-level High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) until last year, when he was removed for blatant corruption (see my previous entries here and here about this). Tegeltija was never going to promote this case against his boss. Nor was Gordana Tadić, until recently Bosnia’s chief prosecutor. Tadić was removed in October of 2021 for a variety of forms of corruption.
With these removals, and the arrival of a new, more honest head of the HJPC, the way was cleared for progress in the mysterious case of Dodik’s credit. Dodik has been described as being visibly nervous about his questioning, but it remains to be seen whether any real headway will be made in the case. And Dodik’s moves toward secession are, at the very least, a form of distraction from his expansive criminality, and at most, a long-term strategy for avoidance of prosecution.
Certain parallels could be drawn here, as always, between Dodik’s behavior and that of the 45th president of the United States.
And as for Tadić, she was removed last year for, among other things, failure to delegate cases of corruption to judges in an impartial manner, along with leaving many cases under wraps for indefinite periods. These included the case of Dodik’s property in Belgrade. Then on April 11 of this year, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implemented sanctions against two Bosnian officials: Gordana Tadić and Asim Sarajlić. Sarajlić, a stalwart of the leading Bosniak SDA party, was recently implicated in an influence-peddling scheme. And the OFAC tagged Tadić not only for her failure to distribute court cases impartially, but also for “using her position as Chief Prosecutor to promote her own personal and familial interests” (2). OFAC also accused Tadić of having received payments via a fictitious contract.
In response to the sanctions Ms. Tadić asked, “What corruption? All my life I have worked honestly.” And the odd thing in all this is that, although Tadić was removed as Chief Prosecutor, she is still a state prosecutor. Given this, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council took interest when Tadić was sanctioned by OFAC. The HJPC wrote a letter to OFAC after the sanctions were imposed, asking for evidence. The reasoning is that if there is proof of Tadić’s criminality, the HJPC would like to know about it and to take measures to remove her from office.
Sanctions
In other sanctions news, the United Kingdom joined the short but growing list of European states that have imposed sanctions on President Dodik. On the same day that OFAC sanctioned Tadić, the UK placed sanctions on Dodik and the RS President, Željka Cvijanović. The sanctions were termed a response to Dodik’s and Cvijanović’s “attempts to undermine the legitimacy and functionality of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (3). The announcement of the sanctions noted actions of the two officials to transfer state-level competencies to the RS entity. It also commented on Cvijanović’s glorification of convicted war criminals, along with her denial of genocide. The sanctions include freezing of assets and a travel ban.
Meanwhile, in mid-April Germany announced the interruption of some infrastructure projects that it was supporting in the RS. These include a wind farm near Nevesinje, the restoration of a hydroelectric dam in Trebinje, and two other projects. Germany is withholding 105 million euros until the RS reverses its moves to transfer state powers to the entity and ends the boycott of state institutions.
On the other hand, Russian investments in the RS have increased since the February escalation of the war in Ukraine. With the price of coal going up throughout Europe due to the war, Russia revived dealings with a dormant coal mine near Bosanski Novi. The renewed investment reflects the cordial relationship between the leaders of the Republika Srpska and Russia. Officials from the RS have vetoed Bosnia’s participation in European sanctions against Russia. In a parliamentary vote taken in late March, not only Dodik’s SNSD, but members of Dragan Čović’s Croat nationalist HDZ voted against sanctions. Two HDZ delegates abstained from the vote, while Čović and one other HDZ member voted against it, which caused a stir.
When asked why he voted against the sanctions, Čović responded that he has been “clearly opposed to Russian aggression,” but that the proposal to back sanctions was not on the approved agenda for the parliamentary session. However, in the last week of April SNSD and HDZ again sidelined a resolution presented by Bosniak representatives to condemn the Russian aggression.
On the other hand, Croat members of the Council of Ministers voted in favor of a proposal to support the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) blockage of funds to Russia and Belarus. Serb members opposed the measure, so it did not pass.
In a further manifestation of ties between the RS and Russia—via Serbia—members of the RS’s Civil Defense corps have cut off coordination of training exercises with the state-level Ministry of Defense. Instead, the RS has arranged for training in Serbia, at a “Russian/Serbian humanitarian center in Niš. International officials have identified this institution, opened 10 years ago, as an intelligence-gathering site for Russian operatives.
Bosnia and the Ukraine War
Russian Ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov thanked Bosnia for its “neutral stance on the Ukraine war.” But, repelled by Russia’s aggression, activists in Sarajevo circulated a petition proposing that the name of the street where the Russian Embassy is located be changed to “Ukraine Street.” Meanwhile the Council of Ministers voted to allow special status, amounting to a renewable six months’ residence in Bosnia, for Ukrainian refugees.
The Bosnian response to the Ukraine war varies from place to place. Activists in Sarajevo also gathered 20 tons of humanitarian aid to be shipped to Ukraine. But in Višegrad 50 people, including entity officials, gathered at a military cemetery to commemorate the participation of Russian volunteers in the 1990s war in Bosnia, on the side of the separatists. During the war some 700 Russians took part, of whom nearly 40 were killed.
On the thirtieth anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war (April 1992), many commentators have noted the similarities between the Ukraine war and what took place in Bosnia. On April 7 the columnist Gojko Berić wrote in Oslobodjenje that “Fascists are on the march again. You don’t have to look for the proof in gas chambers and Eichmann’s death convoys; the TV images of columns of Ukrainian refugees and the pictures of their destroyed cities and villages are sufficient enough.
“Under the impact of Russia’s rockets and bombs in Ukraine, as thirty years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whole cities are disappearing from the face of the earth. And today in Ukraine as in Bosnia thirty years ago, the dead are being buried in parks beside residential high-rises; today, as then, hospitals, nurseries, and theaters are being bombed; hundreds of thousands of women, children, and elderly are fleeing with their bundles ahead of the advance of death…information arrives about rape perpetrated by Russian soldiers in occupied territory. In the city of Bucha mass graves have been discovered with hundreds of dead. Is there any limit to human cruelty?” (5)
And just like Karadžić and Šešelj in the 1990s, Russian officials deny the crimes of their army, which have, in my opinion, accurately been characterized as genocidal. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the evidence of massacres at Bucha a “pre-arranged display.”
The similarities go on. Just like in Serbia and the RS, the fascist voice in Russia co-opts anti-fascism for its own spurious use. In Serbia and the RS the WWII Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović has long since been rehabilitated; in Russia the 20th century pro-fascist philosopher Ivan Ilyin, promoted by the latter-day Rasputin Alexander Dugin (look them up here), has been resurrected as Putin’s guiding light. And Putin pre-empts accusations directed toward his regime by labeling all who identify as Ukrainians as fascists (6).
People are on pins and needles observing the Ukraine war in an already tense Bosnia where Croat and Serb secessionist leaders are rooting for the aggressor, their wartime hopes revived. The breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdniester, strongly evocative of the RS, is next on Russia’s list of targets for “liberation.” And then, what about the RS? It is not far-fetched to imagine that with continued escalation of tensions, Serbia could play Russia’s role, “rescuing” beleaguered brother Serbs in that entity. Here, again, it is clear that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own survival, but for the freedom of the rest of Europe. So it is to be fervently hoped that a Ukrainian victory will take the wind out of the sails of European fascism ascendant.
But there are problems with this hopeful scenario. How much is Europe, backed by the US, willing to stand up to Russian aggression? The weapons sent to Ukraine have made a difference. But Europe is still buying oil, gas, and coal from Russia to the tune of a billion dollars a day—and much of that fuel is still being transported through Ukraine! The willingness of Europe truly to oppose Russian force could be measured by its willingness to suffer through deprivation of fuel for a while.
Now is a time to recognize that oil trade fuels war, and now is a time to convert, belatedly, to sustainable, green energy sources. Germany has announced that it hopes to wean itself from Russian fuel sources by the end of 2022. Will there be anything left of an independent Ukraine by then?
Amidst all the similarities between 1990s Bosnia and today’s Ukraine, there are a couple of outstanding differences. First, on February 24, Ukraine already had an army, while in April of 1992, Bosnia was barely cobbling together some pro-government militias. Secondly, the West has avidly been supplying Ukraine with the most up-to-date weapons, while conversely, in Bosnia it was implementing an arms embargo. Given all this, it’s a miracle that Bosnia was even able to save half its territory.
Furthermore, it would not be acceptable to ignore the hypocrisy of Poland and other front-line states in welcoming the White, Christian refugees from Ukraine—as they fully deserve—while the same states are rejecting and abusing other arrivals from Ukraine including Roma, African students, and “migrants” from north Africa and the Middle East. Of the many commentators who have pointed this out, not one begrudged the Ukrainian refugees their rights, under international law, to shelter in nearby states. The same respect and rights are due, but not afforded, to Yemenis, Palestinians, Central American migrants, and many others around the world.
Elections
Bosnia’s national elections are due to take place on October 2 of this year; both houses of parliament in both entities will be elected, along with members of the three-part, state-level presidency. There are multiple levels of problems in the functioning of these elections over the years, and they break down into two broad categories: one is technical, and the other political.
In the technical category, there are a handful of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that have sought to rectify anti-democratic dynamics built into the Dayton Constitution. These include the fact that only a Serb can run for member of the state-level presidency in the RS, and a Serb cannot run for that office from the Federation. Similarly, a Jew, Rom, “Other,” or someone who identifies as a Bosnian cannot run for that office from any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ECHR has—ever since 2009—called for the rectification of these problems, but nothing has been done. Meanwhile, there are matters of transparency and honesty in elections that could be addressed by technical changes in the electoral law, but have not.
The other group of problems pertains to the election of the Croat member of the state-level presidency from the Federation, as well as the way members of the upper chamber of parliament, the House of Peoples, are elected both in the Federation and at the state level. For three of the past four national elections Željko Komšić, an anti-nationalist politician who identifies as a Croat, has taken the Croat membership in the state-level presidency, defeating HDZ chief Dragan Čović each time. Because any voter can vote for any candidate in the Federation, Bosniak voters played a critical role in electing the Croat member—while in recent years, Croats also have gradually voted less and less for the nationalist candidate.
The HDZ (the strongest party among the Croats) has more and more strongly objected to this dynamic over the years, demanding a version of electoral reform that would ensure the victory of that party in perpetuity. The party’s objection to the ongoing functioning of the government of the Federation in the old way has been so strong that it has obstructed the creation of a new government in that entity ever since the 2018 national elections.
In the past year there have been many rounds of negotiations between the HDZ and leading “pro-Bosnia” parties—principally the SDA (led by Bakir Izetbegović), to hammer out electoral reforms. Discussions were held in Neum, in Sarajevo, and in Brussels up until quite recently, with no results. The HDZ ignored the ECHR findings, and the SDA and others declined to cave in to the HDZ’s demands.
With an early May deadline for changes in electoral law looming, international officials who were promoting electoral reform—often in very ill-thought out ways—gave up on the process. But the HDZ did not, and in the last week of April the party was calling for the last-minute, streamlined adoption of the same skewed package of changes.
The essence of the HDZ proposal is that votes for the Croat member of the state-level presidency should be counted, not from each of the ten Cantons in the Federation, but from the five Cantons where Croats are in the majority and where support for the HDZ is the strongest. Among other objections to this proposal, it would marginalize the Croat population in the Cantons where Croat numbers are smaller. Above all, the proposal is seen as an unconstitutional way to revive the wartime statelet of Herceg-Bosna in the form of a de facto third entity.
Pro-Bosnia parties, led by the SDA, boycotted the House of Peoples session where the HDZ proposal was to be aired, so that at the end of April, no reform has been achieved. There is a danger that Croat nationalist leaders could decide to boycott the October elections. The elections could also be delayed by virtue of lack of funding, which comes from the state treasury. So far—and the time is getting very close—the government has not allocated the 11.7 million KM needed to run the elections.
Both Minister of Finance Vjekoslav Bevanda, a Croat and member of the HDZ, and Zoran Tegeltija, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (equivalent to Prime Minister of Bosnia), have obstructed earmarking of these funds. One excuse is that the state budgets for 2021 and 2022 have not been adopted; state functions are running on special allocations. Meanwhile, Tegeltija has refused to place the question of election finance on the Council of Ministers’ agenda—even though that body has adopted other funding measures. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in yet another way, Croat and Serb separatists are colluding to destabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Central Election Commission has fought to obtain funding, which must be available by mid-May, pointing out that there are budget surpluses from previous years, that can be used to adequately fund the elections.
In promotion of a Croat boycott of the elections, some Croat officials have stated openly that, without (their version of) reform, there is no basis to hold elections. Pro-Bosnian commentators have pointed out that Dragan Čović has won elections several times under the very laws that are now in question. Western international officials have lined up to proclaim that the elections must go on. And in late April Čović himself commented that he did not expect there to be a boycott, but that the final decision on this would come from the HNS (Hrvatski Narodni Sabor/Croatian National Assembly) a nationalist organization of Croats that supports the idea of a third entity. A Croat boycott could become the big controversy of the season, or it could fizzle. Time will tell.
(https://survivingthepeace.org/)